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Abstract. The article focuses on a current debate in contemporary ethics between 
so-called situationists and the advocates of virtue ethics. The fundamental assump-
tion made by virtue ethics is that developing and perfecting one’s moral character 
or moral virtues warrants one’s morally good action. Situationists claim that this as-
sumption contradicts the results of the latest empirical studies. From this observa-
tion they conclude that virtue ethics is based on an empirically inadequate moral 
psychology. In the first part of the article, I present the conceptions of virtue and 
moral character developed in response to the situationist critique. I show to which 
degree these conceptions differ from the classical, so-called global approach in vir-
tue ethics. In the second part, based on the latest empirical studies in social and co-
gnitive psychology, I argue, against the situationist objection, that the classical no-
tion of virtue meets the requirement of empirical adequacy. I mainly resort to the 
interactionist theory of personality by W. Mischel, R. Baumeister’s studies over self-
control, D. Kahneman’s dual-processing theory of the mind, and the studies over au-
tomatized processes by J. Bargh.
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Introduction
Contemporary virtue ethics is one of the most common ethical theories. 
Contrarily to utilitarianism and deontology, which are labeled act-cen-
tered ethics, virtue ethics does not focus on the moral act and moral prin-
ciples that enable one to evaluate an act. Virtue ethics concentrates on 
the moral agent and building up his or her good character; on building it 
through shaping virtues which are to guarantee one’s morally good ac-
tion. Virtue ethicists maintain that a virtuous agent is someone who not 
only knows what he or she should do but is also sufficiently motivated to 
act according to this knowledge. Thus, in their research, virtue ethicists 
focus on the human person and her moral condition, her specific possibil-
ities, and limitations. This also includes the interest in moral education, 
especially the process of acquiring ethical virtues, understood as cogni-
tive-affective dispositions to a morally good action.
The turn of the 20th and the 21st century witnessed the height of its 
development as well as the moment of its most intense criticism. On the 
one hand, the strong position of virtue ethics has been confirmed by 
a considerable number of its applications. On the other hand, however, 
virtue ethics is facing the most fundamental criticism from the ethicists 
inspired by the empirical research results in social and cognitive psychol-
ogy. The critics, John Doris, Gilbert Harman, Maria Merrit, Peter Vranas 
– so-called situationists – argue that virtue ethics is empirically inade-
quate because it is founded on moral psychology which has been falsified 
by the latest empirical data (Doris 1998, 2002; Harman 1999, 2000, 2003; 
Merritt 2000; Vranas 2005).
Situationists try to convince us that our mode of behavior is decisively 
under the influence of so-called situational factors, while virtues (per-
sonological factors) are at best of secondary importance. This view, ac-
cording to its advocates, finds its confirmation in various historical and 
empirical data, which point at authority, social role, or mood (among oth-
ers) as the factors determining our moral behavior. Some even deny the 
existence of practical wisdom (or phronesis), so central to virtue ethics. 
This denial is supported by the reference to the data in cognitive psy-
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chology, which allegedly suggest that automatic mechanisms determine 
most human actions, and are subject to what is called priming,1 framing,2 
or mere exposure effects.3 In many cases, the work of these mechanisms is 
incongruent with moral views and convictions of ordinary human agents. 
So, situationists conclude, if one is to mention any virtues at all, one could 
speak of them only locally, i.e., as particular modes of reacting or behav-
ing in specific, narrow contexts (Merritt, Doris and Harman 2010).
Situationists characterize classical virtues as global – i.e., consisting 
of constant and integrated behavior congruent with the whole system of 
values. In this view, if someone has the virtue of honesty, such a per-
son behaves honestly stably and consistently, regardless of fluctuating 
circumstances. Additionally, globally taken honesty is closely correlated 
with other virtues – truthfulness or justice, for example. It is so because 
one cannot be at the same time honest and tell lies or be biased (or par-
tial). Situationists question the possibility of virtue globally understood, 
and offer its local account instead. As they argue, when it comes to influ-
encing human behavior, the factor of utmost importance is the situation 
in which the behavior takes place. Thus one should explain the regularity 
of certain behaviors in terms of situational factors rather than by the ref-
erence to any psychological traits of the agent. If then one wants to speak 
1 The priming effect consists in enlarging the probability of use of a  certain type of 
cognitive category through the repetitive exposure to a certain type of stimuli that are 
semantically and affectively related to a specific category (e.g., kindness or senility). 
Bargh and his colleagues carried out a series of experiments in which the subjects were 
supposed to make sentences out of word pieces. The subjects who made sentences 
with the words relating to unkindness showed a much lower level of patience than the 
subjects in the control group (using neutral words in the puzzles); the subjects who 
were making sentences with the words relating to senity were later on much more slow 
performing their tasks than the control group (Bargh, Chen and Burrows 1996).
2 D. Kahneman points at this kind of influence. He gives an example of studies in which 
subjects were presented two choice options of the same logical value: “benefits will 
maintain on the level of 70%” and “losses will maintain on the level of 30%”. The 
subjects more often chose the former option, since it was more beneficial. What was 
decisive about their choice was the word used in the sentence: “benefit” or “loss”. The 
subjects automatically reacted in a positive way to the term “benefit” and in a negative 
way to the term “loss” (Kahneman 2011).
3 The pure exposure effect consists in the fact that we usually value more highly what we 
already know (Kahneman 2011).
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of honesty, one can merely refer to honesty in a narrow sense, understood 
as a trait that manifests itself only in certain circumstances (Doris 2002). 
The situationist critique of virtue ethics evoked a lively debate not only 
between virtue ethicists and situationists but also among virtue ethicists 
themselves. Although this debate primarily focuses on the existence and 
nature of virtues, it also touches on the issue of autonomy of ethics and 
the specificity of its categories. Most arguments used in it are not phil-
osophical but based on empirical data gathered from experimental psy-
chology. The advocates of the autonomy of ethics might then say that it 
makes no sense to debate with situationists because their accusations do 
not relate to normative virtue ethics. At best, they describe real human 
behavior, human morality, and as was already noticed by Hume, one can-
not draw any normative conclusions out of purely descriptive statements 
(Hume 2008). However, virtue ethicists accepted the situationists’ claim 
that any ethical theory should meet the condition of minimal psychologi-
cal realism. If certain norms are to be obligatory, they must assume em-
pirically adequate moral psychology; or in other words: “ought” must im-
ply “can” (Flanagan 1993, 15–56; Doris 2002). 
In my article I want to focus on the notion of virtue developed after 
the “person-situation debate.” The local account of virtue offered by sit-
uationists has lately faced at least three fully developed responses. One, 
relatively more acceptable to situationists, has been provided by Robert 
Adams (2006). Another one was formulated by Christian Miller (2013, 
2014), who defends character but doubts the empirical adequacy of glob-
al virtue. And the third one is the response that I consider to be the most 
convincing, offered by Nancy Snow (2008), Dan Russell (2009, 2013), Dar-
cia Narvaez and Daniel Lapsey (2005), and others, who defend the com-
patibility of traditionally understood virtue with the empirical research 
in contemporary psychology. The questions I ask in my paper are the fol-
lowing: Are situationists right? Has their critique of virtue ethics con-
vincingly rejected traditionally understood virtues and virtue ethics? To 
what extent has the situationist critique influenced the ethicists of vir-
tue? Answering these questions, I will also show how normative ethics 
should use the results of empirical research in experimental psychology.
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I will begin discussing two conceptions of virtue, one by Adams and 
one by Miller. Both are formulated in response to the situationist critique. 
I will show how much these two views of virtue depart from the classical, 
global, understanding of virtue, as well as how far they are from Doris’ 
idea of local virtues. Then, I will pass on to the defense of virtue globally 
understood. I will present arguments showing that the concept of global 
virtue coheres with the latest findings in experimental psychology. 
1. Robert Adams’ conception of virtue and deflacionism
Let us start with the deflationist approach to virtue presented by Adams, 
the author of A Theory of Virtue (2006), whose deflationism was positively 
received by Doris, who praised the book for its respect to John Doris’ prin-
ciple of psychological realism (2010).
However, ascribing a deflationist view to Adams is debatable. On the 
one hand, he admits that empirical data show the impossibility of glob-
ally understood ethical virtues and that virtues should be at best under-
stood as probabilistic and modular. By being probabilistic, he means that 
a person who has a given virtue, let us say honesty, will not necessarily al-
ways act honestly but only in such a way that the probability of her behav-
ing honestly will be relatively high. By modularity of virtues, he means 
that there are numerous and independent dispositions. People acquire 
dispositions to specific types of behavior, related to separate domains of 
activity. One can understand these domains in various ways: narrowly, as 
related to one very particular kind of situation; or more widely, as associ-
ated with a specific social role (like being a father, mother, or husband). 
Such simple behavioral dispositions can be accumulated, and thus consti-
tute a broader disposition, which will also manifest behaviorally in vari-
ous domains of human life (2006, 123-126).
But on the other hand, Adams differentiates virtues from Virtue, 
which he defines as perfection in striving for goodness. Virtue (written 
with capital V) has no plural form. It is a kind of whole, just as the mor-
ally good character, the possession of which consists not only in the in-
stantiation of many positive features but also in their being perfectly in-
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tegrated. Although Adams is not an advocate of the doctrine of the unity 
of virtues, he does believe that some of the virtues – e.g., such cardinal 
virtues as courage, temperance, self-control, justice, or wisdom– are es-
sential, and it is difficult to imagine a virtuous person without them. Be-
sides, virtue is not composed of accidental and unrelated components. 
On the contrary, its components make an integrated whole which can be 
treated as a property of a person encompassing her convictions, attitudes, 
desires, values, and agency (2006, 201–209).
While the probabilistic and modular understanding of virtue is close 
to the situationist perspective, and, when compared to the traditional ap-
proach to virtues, it could be recognized as deflationist, it is hard to call 
Adams a deflationist once we take into account all the elements of his 
conception of virtue. Indeed, Adams does seem to «soften» the concept 
of virtue by accepting thinner criteria for a person to qualify as virtuous. 
However, when it comes to formulating the normative ideal and goal of 
life, he maintains the traditional «thick» (or inflated) understanding of 
virtue. Also, his approach to moral education, to its role and significance, 
is as far away as it can be from situationism. Adams is an advocate of mor-
al education via perfection of ethical virtues. Although in his opinion, 
such education starts with acquiring modular and probabilistic virtues, it 
then expands them towards a holistically understood, morally good char-
acter. Besides, what Adams means by virtuous action is not so much just 
behavior as the proper motivation, which is questioned by situationists.
2. Christian Miller and mixed traits
The situationist critique of virtue ethics also led to the formulation by 
Christian Miller of the “mixed traits” concept, which in a way can be seen 
as a triumph of situationism (2013, 154–155). According to this approach, 
on the one hand, most people have traits that are neither virtues nor vices 
in the traditional sense. Human traits are something in between vice and 
virtue, which explains why most of human behavior is fragmented, being 
neither purely good nor purely evil. On the other hand, however, mixed 
traits are stable and cross-situationally consistent in certain ways (Miller 
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2013, 155–158). They can differ from one person to the next, vary in how 
specifically or how generallly they can be individuated; they often carry out 
their psychological processing without conscious awareness, and so forth.
Contrary to what situationists claim, this means that there is some-
thing like moral character. And although one cannot evaluate it using sim-
ple categories of good and evil, particularly vice and virtue, one cannot say 
that there is nothing in a person that determines her behavior, or that it is 
not robust enough to manifest itself in consistent behavior. Even if these 
mixed traits merely play the role of media between situational stimuli and 
the behavior caused by them, the way a person reacts to the situation de-
pends on her moral character, her traits and dispositions, e.g., her empa-
thy, her ability to admire and respect certain things, her moral norms or 
convictions (Miller 2013, 3–12). Following the situationists’ advice, Miller 
appreciates the significance of a situation; however he does not question 
the importance of personological traits and their influence on behavior.
Although they offer different strategies of converting locally under-
stood virtues into something broader, Adams and Miller both question 
(and here situationists may triumph) the psychological realism of glob-
ally understood virtues.
3. In defense of virtue globalism
A theory of virtue and virtue ethics can satisfy the condition of psycho-
logical realism in two ways: factually and potentially. The former consists 
in finding the empirical proof that there are real people who exemplify 
global virtues; the latter would show the very possibility of global virtues 
and their consistency with how the human being behaves.
The quest of factually virtuous people is quite troublesome for vari-
ous reasons: firstly, it is difficult to measure virtue in zero-one mode (ei-
ther one is virtuous or one is not). Acquiring a virtue is a continuous and 
never-ending process. Thus it is gradual, and so must be the possession of 
virtue. One might focus on identifying a minimal threshold of virtue, e.g., 
inflicting pain or suffering to an innocent person. Also, total indifference 
to injustice would disqualify one as a virtuous person. However, identi-
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fying such attitudes during experiments is not easy: experiments rarely 
consist of observing a person for a long time in a series of situations; usu-
ally, subjects have only one opportunity to act, which does not necessar-
ily unveil their actual moral character.
Does the scarcity of virtue and virtuous people undermine the psy-
chological realism of virtue ethics? In some respects, it seems so. For ex-
ample, there are not many people (if any) who could be seen as paragons 
of virtue. But do ideals have to be fully accomplished? The examples of 
morally good actions to follow may have various sources (heroic stories, 
and rare, but still real, examples of moral heroes). We do not find it diffi-
cult to tell apart people who deserve moral admiration from those who do 
not. The research shows that even children are able to identify behavior 
which is just, honest, or benevolent (Snow 2008, 26).
In defense of the empirical adequacy of virtues, it might be sufficient 
to focus on showing that perfecting virtue and virtuous action is (con-
trary to what situationists say) not inconsistent with the findings of con-
temporary psychology. A few examples are worth mentioning here: Cog-
nitive-Affective Personality System (Mischel and Shoda), our knowledge 
about self-control, and self-regulation (Baumeister), as well as the role 
and significance of automatic processes in human life (Kahneman, Bar-
gh). We now turn to them.
3.1. Cognitive-Affective Personality System [CAPS] 
(W. Mischel and Y. Shoda)
Moral character and virtues may have their psychological (i.e., empiri-
cal) foundation in the Cognitive-Affective Personality System (Mischel 
and Shoda), which assumes a  social-cognitive approach to personality. 
The system is understood in terms of mediating nets of various processes 
thanks to which people interpret reality and adjust their behavior to it in 
a specific, individual way. According to this approach, every human being 
possesses a dynamic and individually defined personality, which could be 
described via their behavior profile. The patterns are laid out in the form 
of “if situation A occurs, then x behaves in B way.” A crucial element in 
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this description is the way x construes (perceives or interprets) situation 
A (Shoda, Mischel and Wright 1994).
People differ from each other by having different beliefs, desires, feel-
ings, goals, values, memories, etc., in short, by everything that constitutes 
their identity. The way people react to various situations depends on them, 
on how they perceive and interpret their situations and events, either at 
the reflective level or at the level of automatized processes. Of course, the 
reactions are shaped by the net of various interactions between all these 
cognitive and affective elements. However, one can still speak here of in-
dividual traits of character, taken as complex sets of cognitive-affective 
processes that activate themselves in response to subjective construals of 
objective features of a given situation. These traits are relatively constant 
and show situational consistency (Shoda, Mischel and Wright 1994).
Every individual CAPS trait has a relatively constant and identifiable 
structure that differentiates it from other features of a person. The theo-
retical structure of traditionally understood virtue seems very similar to 
that of CAPS. Virtues, taken as dispositions of moral character, are un-
derstood as relatively constant configurations of such elements as moral 
beliefs, motivations, and affective reactions, which remain ready to be 
activated whenever a  relevant situation occurs. One cannot define vir-
tues, as situationists tend to do, exclusively in behavioral terms. Virtues 
are dispositions to respond appropriately to arising moral reasons. As 
such, they involve a specific way of perception, interpretation, and evalu-
ation of a situation. An honest person perceives and evaluates frauds, lies, 
or overinterpretations of facts as something morally inappropriate, and 
she tries to react appropriately – for example by non-acceptance, or dis-
sent. Someone ready to help when seeing another person in need does not 
see a potential danger but a situation requiring one to show support (Mis-
chel and Shoda 1995; Shoda, Tiernan and Mischel 2002).
The difference between CAPS and ethical virtues is such that CAPS 
traits are understood (by Mischel and Shoda) merely as local, while tradi-
tional virtues have global character. There is an ongoing debate between 
the advocates and opponents of virtue ethics over the question of wheth-
er – and if so, then how and to which extent– CAPS traits could be wid-
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ened (broadened) to achieve the form of global traits. Numerous partici-
pants in this debate, on both sides, are skeptical of such possibility (Doris 
2002; Miller 2013, 2014).
Various authors give examples of such traits and character disposi-
tions that show the tendency to be global –  cover more and more do-
mains of human life. For instance, Nancy Snow points at such a tendency 
in a negative disposition to get irritated. She also speaks of a method by 
which we can globalize a certain positive trait – e.g., the ability to show 
compassion– even if initially it is not global in itself (Snow 2008, 31–38). 
I want to draw attention to one such broad disposition that conditions the 
perfecting of all other virtues, namely self-control (Szutta 2020). There is 
no need to convince anyone of how disastrous the consequences of totally 
losing control over one’s emotions, feelings, or reactions could be.
3.2. Self-control as a broad disposition (R. Baumeister)
One of the most widely-known authorities on self-regulating processes 
is R. Baumeister, the psychologist who, based on an extensive empirical 
material, claims that humans have a very high level of ability to self-reg-
ulation. To a large extent they can control their thoughts (e.g., focusing 
on a chosen task), emotions (e.g., by trying to overcome bad moods), im-
pulses (e.g., by resisting various temptations), and behavior (Baumeister, 
Heatherton and Tice 1994).
However, he notices that a person navigates a broad scope of activi-
ties and processes; therefore, a characteristic feature of self-regulation is 
that various processes overlap, interfering, suppressing, or replacing each 
other. The first condition of the activation of the self-regulation process 
is to define the goals and ideals which a given person wants to achieve. 
The goals set the standards and norms that, in turn, allow one to moni-
tor one’s own thoughts and actions. The goals must be consistent and 
well-defined; otherwise self-regulation will be inefficient. Secondly, one 
needs to reflect on the current ways of reacting. If they are congruent 
with one’s standards, they will be maintained; if, however, there is some 
incongruence between these ways of reacting and one’s goals, the former 
need to be changed. Thirdly, one needs to know how to overcome set-
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tled reactions and install new ones, as well as one needs to have enough 
power of will to install and strengthen the new ways of reacting. Meeting 
these three conditions guarantees efficient self-regulation. Self-regula-
tion comes down to making the higher processes control the lower ones. 
The very process of overcoming some processes by others is often de-
scribed as the struggle between various forces within us. Let us take an 
example from fighting obesity or other addictions. Two incongruent ten-
dencies compete with each other: the drive to eat or smoke, on the one 
hand, and the desire to be fit or quit smoking, on the other. In the context 
of morality one may point at the example of choosing an easier way: ly-
ing, breaking a promise, or being lazy, instead of respecting relevant mor-
al principles. It is a difficult struggle; however, psychologists know many 
motivational techniques of coping with unwanted psychological mecha-
nisms (Baumeister and Tierney 2011).
Baumeister compares self-regulating skills to the power of the will as 
it is traditionally understood in ethics. He speaks of the will as a kind of 
muscle, which can be trained and strengthened through various tech-
niques. The best way to do so is to set a sequence of goals, ordering them 
from easier to more and more difficult ones; this may yield outstanding 
results in the end. Baumeister gives the example of the American illu-
sionist David Blaine, whose achievements are breathtaking. He was able 
to survive 63 hours locked in an ice-cube, he managed to spend six days 
in a nailed coffin with hardly any free space, and endured 44 days without 
food hanging in a black box over the River Thames (Baumeister and Tier-
ney 2011). One need not resort to such extreme examples; it is enough to 
mention any well-known sportsman, scientist, or musician. Anyone who 
seriously trains within a given field knows that there is no success with-
out hard daily work, which requires self-control. It is interesting that the 
research on self-control led to the observation that training the will in 
one domain – e.g., science, or non-violence– gives better results in self-
control and in other areas. For example, subjects who trained in the field 
of their profession and also practiced some sport more often, controlled 
their expenditures better, smoked less or drank less alcohol. Moreover, 
their will became depleted more slowly. All this means that we, humans, 
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can broaden the narrow dispositions of character to guarantee morally 
good behavior in more and more domains of life (Megan Oaten 2006a, 
2006b).
What is the mechanism of the ego (will)-depletion? The will, analo-
gously to muscles, becomes tired when working for a long time. One can-
not control oneself all the time without a break. The ego-depletion mani-
fests itself in weaker self-control; hyphened intensiveness of experienced 
emotions (positive ones, such as exaltation, euphoria, and negative ones, 
such as disappointment or despondency for trivial reasons); lowered level 
of decision-making (e.g., quickly giving up under the influence of exter-
nal factors, moods, etc.) (Baumeister et al.1998; Baumeister and Tierney 
2011). Various historical facts (Rwanda, Abu Graib) or the cases of neg-
atively evaluated behavior during psychological experiments (Milgram, 
Zimbardo) can be explained by reference to this phenomenon.
Such a phenomenon, it may seem, contradicts one of the central as-
sumptions of virtue ethics, according to which a well-formed character 
should warrant a morally good action. Also, the inevitability of depleted 
ego seems to undermine this assumption. Various empirical data suggest, 
however, that the process of ego depleting is much slower, or is not ob-
served at all if the agent is strongly motivated to a specific type of action 
(Rayan and Deci, 2004). Empirical data confirm the so-called flow effect 
that causes properly focused and internally motivated people can keep 
realizing their tasks with satisfaction and pleasure, without feeling tired 
(Csíkszentmihályi 1990). It is worth underlying that the advocates of vir-
tue ethics emphasize the motivational dimension of a morally good ac-
tion. A virtuous person is not only someone who acts in accordance with 
virtues (of honesty, justice, or benevolence) but also someone who enjoys 
them and identifies with them and with their requirements.
3.3. Kahneman and the dual-processing theory of the mind 
However, ethicists should not forget about the mechanism of will deple-
tion, which, according to the latest research in cognitive psychology, has 
its analogue in the domain of cognitive processes. According to Kahne-
mans dual-processing theory, the human mind works on two levels, or 
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by using two systems (Kahneman 2011). System 1 (the quick one) is re-
sponsible for automatized processes. It effortlessly produces impressions 
and emotions, which then become the source of our decisions and choic-
es. System 2 (the slow one) requires conscious effort and is responsible 
for controlled thinking, monitoring its actions and tempering emotions. 
Both systems remain continuously active in our minds. Automatized sys-
tem 1 restlessly generates various data (impressions, hunches, intentions, 
emotions, etc.). One cannot simply turn it off. Reflective system 2, lazy 
by nature, remains in a mode of low activity. It usually passively accepts 
what system 1 delivers. Only when encountering difficulties does system 
2 become more active.
The dual-processing theory finds its support in various data, e.g., in 
cognitive illusions to which we repeatedly fall prey. Cognitive illusions 
are the effects of our passive giving in to system 1. Numerous cases of 
“priming effect,” “interpretation framing effect,” or “the effect of cogni-
tive easiness” drew the attention of situationists as examples of factors 
other than our will determining our action. However, Kahneman does not 
claim that we are doomed to the workings of system 1. He encourages us 
to activate reflective system 2. Nonetheless similarly to Baumeister, he 
acknowledges that the process of ego depletion, the limited resources of 
the ego, and the human general tendency spontaneously delegate various 
activities on system 1. 
The fact that the ego’s depletion results in the automatization of hu-
man cognition and action gives situationists a good argument against 
virtue ethics, because its advocates often emphasize the importance of 
practical wisdom for action (Merritt, Doris and Harman 2010). 
But is this convincing as a acriticism of virtue ethics? 
3.4. John Bargh & mixed processes
Let us notice that virtue ethics seems to be the only ethical theory that 
answers the question of how to cope with the fact of ego depletion when 
our abilities to reflect and self-control are diminished. Virtues are dispo-
sitions that are partly habitual and partly deliberative. The approach to 
virtue, with its emphasis on the centrality of phronesis, does not exclude 
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the possibility of automatic responses as a  constituent element of vir-
tue. On the contrary, all the process of virtue formation aims at smooth 
and efficient acting, automatic but resulting from the experience gath-
ered through earlier deliberations and practice and open to new deliber-
ations when necessary (similarly to the acquisition of non-ethical skills, 
e.g., playing an instrument or medical expertise). These skills, although 
containing an element of automaticity, cannot be reduced to automatic 
habits alone.
John Bargh and his colleagues show in their experiments that seem-
ingly automatic processes like those causing priming or framing effects, do 
not reduce totally to the unconscious. They show that there is no sharp 
borderline between controlled processes, often labeled as conscious and 
intentional, and those which are automatic, labeled as unintentional, in-
voluntary, and effortless. A lot of processes we regard as automatic, like 
reading, typing, or driving a car, are also controlled and goal-dependent. 
While doing these things, we are rarely conscious of all the sequence of 
steps or movements taken, but all these elements are directed at the goal 
which we consciously choose. As Bargh and colleges claim, the conscious 
and automatic are often very neatly interwoven, and therefore the tra-
ditional classification of mental processes as either mechanical or con-
trolled is mistaken and does not reflect the facts (Bargh 1989, 3–7).
Bargh distinguishes three types of automatized mental processes. Let 
us take a look at three of them: preconscious processes (e.g., interpreting 
and evaluating situations through one’s previously acquired construals), 
post-conscious process (e.g., helping behavior resulting from one’s good 
mood, with no awareness of the influence of the latter on the former), 
and, most important for defending virtue, goal-dependent automatic 
processes (e.g., an experienced, skillful driver driving a car).
Mechanical processes of this type embrace a whole sequence of auto-
matic steps or learned patterns (scripts) of reaction to various situations. 
These imprinted (memorized) and automatized processes direct attention 
and action with minimal control on the part of the agent. They cannot, 
however, be reduced to merely routine activities. As directed towards the 
realization of a definite goal, they must be flexible and continuously ad-
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justed to the dynamically changing circumstances (just like when driving 
a car, even if one knows the route very well, and the activity is mostly au-
tomatic, one must stay conscious of the possible changes of the circum-
stances, e.g., when the traffic is high, and many unforeseen activities or 
events may occur). All this shows that automatic processes are strongly 
interwoven with consciously controlled ones (Bargh 1989, 10–28).
All the mentioned types of automatized processes are important for 
understanding the moral functioning of a human agent. They not only un-
dermine the situationist claim that virtue or moral character are impossi-
ble, but also help us define virtues and moral character in a more precise 
way. Preconscious automatic processes (influence of subconscious con-
structs or evaluation schemes) define the identity of their possessor. How 
one unconsciously interprets or evaluates his or her given situation char-
acterizes one as a certain type of person, and reveals one’s typical pattern 
of thinking, motivation, or behavior. Thus, in a way, these unconscious in-
terpretations reveal one’s moral character. One can have a look at a weak, 
defenseless person and automatically see in her someone in need of help, 
or someone of whom one could take advantage (e.g., robe or steal). One 
may automatically perceive another person as someone deserving compas-
sion or as someone deserving contempt (Narvaez and Lapsley 2005, 146). 
This preconscious way of perception and evaluation usually results from 
the accumulation of previous experiences, education, and various types of 
construals. The remaining two of the three abovementioned types of au-
tomatic processes also cohere with the perspective of virtue ethics, which 
not only emphasizes the importance of morally good actions but also pays 
special attention to the proper attitudes of moral agents. 
Discovering how post-conscious automatic processes influence moral 
decisions may help us understand the role of moral perception and moral 
emotions, including their mutual interference. The framing effect may be 
successfully used in moral character education, for example, by exposing 
children to morally desirable traits of character, such as honesty or be-
nevolence (and explaining children the role of those features in life). The 
constructs implanted this way in children’s minds may become a source 
of their later moral insights, and influence their decisions at a non-con-
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scious level (Narvaez and Lapsey 2005, 147). Also, knowledge about the 
mood effect should be helpful in building virtue. Learning about the role 
of small pleasures in life, we realize that we have to be good to ourselves 
to become more benevolent to others. 
From the ethical point of view, the most essential automatic processes 
are those that are goal-oriented. Not without reason, ethical virtues are 
compared to various constant and acquired skills that require knowledge 
and experience. Although to a large extent they consist of automatized 
and routinized sub-processes, they are not reducible to such elements. As 
goal-oriented processes they must contain some level of conscious con-
trol, evaluation of current circumstances of action, and flexible adjust-
ment to the changing factors. A skillful driver, even while driving “au-
tomatically,” must pay attention to changing circumstances. Similarly, 
a truthful person who usually openly says what she knows, on discover-
ing that being truthful could have morally negative consequences, needs 
to consciously consider whether, for example, a person asking a question 
is entitled to the true answer. Someone who always automatically says 
the truth to anyone, regardless of circumstances, can hardly be consid-
ered an example of virtue. It is so because a virtuous person should also 
be prudent, have practical wisdom to grasp what “here and now” should 
be done. Such insights are the consequence of previous experiences and 
deliberations over moral matters. The greater moral experience is, the 
more intuitive (or automatic) the insights; the smaller it is, the greater the 
need of conscious deliberation. 
The fact that these processes are to a large extent automatic does not 
exclude the possibility of making their formation one of the goals of vir-
tue education. Proper formation of moral intuitions enables one to make 
the right decisions without having to spend a lot of time on moral deliber-
ations. Although complex decision procedures might be sometimes help-
ful, especially in complex situations of conflict between important values 
(in which it is difficult to find an easy, quick solution), in everyday life it 
is more practical to use tested and reliable schemes of action.
The schemes of reasoning and moral perception are also automatized. 
An expert associates things faster and more efficiently, interprets situ-
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ations more accurately than a beginner. All this is done in a more intui-
tive, non-inferential way. An expert uses automatic mechanisms not yet 
accessible to a beginner, who needs to achieve his decisions through the 
process of complicated and effortful deliberations (Narvaez and Lapsey 
2005, 150–152; Narvaez and Bock 2014, 140–141). Let us take an example 
of an experienced medical doctor, and compare him to one who has just 
graduated. The former can read and interpret medical facts with ease, 
and reliably prescribe the best therapy; the latter needs much more effort 
to achieve results that will still be less reliable. This, of course, does not 
mean that the experienced doctor would never make a mistake; however, 
should he make one, this would not totally undermine the value of his ex-
pert intuitions. We can speak analogically of experienced teachers, musi-
cians, lawyers, drivers, etc.
Virtue ethics, like no other ethical theory, is firmly consistent with 
empirical data within moral psychology and encompasses bothconscious-
ly controlled and automatic processes. Both can be used in moral devel-
opment. On the one hand, virtue ethicists encourage us to improve our 
behavior via enhancing our semi-automatized schemes of behavior and 
intuitions, and, on the other hand, this theory underlines the importance 
of conscious efforts that are necessary for the formation and enhance-
ment of those mechanisms. 
Conclusion
In spite of having no access to the tools of contemporary psychology, Ar-
istotle, the father of virtue ethics, had very accurate intuitions. Virtue 
ethics, probably like no other ethical theory, emphasizes the significance 
of introducing and shaping automatic mechanisms that enhance morally 
good action. These mechanisms are especially important when the agent 
has either little time or a depleted will, as to be able to make the right de-
cision on the basis of proper conscious deliberations. The person-situa-
tion debate, inspired by the situationist objection of the empirical inad-
equacy of virtue ethics, has paradoxically shown the realism of the virtue 
ethics approach. Neither utilitarianism nor deontological approaches use 
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the idea of automatized cognitive, affective and behavioral mechanisms 
to such an extent as virtue ethics does. This is also the opinion of those 
working in the field of neuroethics (Mróz 2018), a good example being 
P. Churchland. The winner in her ranking list is nobody else but Aristotle 
and his version of virtue ethics (Churchland 2012). The only worry here 
is whether neuroethics does not totally reduce virtue to its automatized 
element.
The character-situation debate was also inspiring to virtue ethicists. 
It showed them that normative ethics could not develop in total isolation 
from empirical studies; the results of normative deliberation should go 
along and be compatible with empirical findings about human nature and 
human agency. Because what is beyond the reach of human nature, what 
is impossible, cannot by any means oblige. 
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